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Luther A. Huston
The appointment in 1953 of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the
United States marked the beginning of a new era in the development
of constitutional law. In the ensuing years changes of vast dimension
and historic impact have taken place. Few men are better qualified
to assess the significance of the decisions of the Warren Court than
Archibald Cox, student of law, teacher of law and, from 1961 to
1965, Solicitor General of the United States. As Solicitor General,
he literally sat at the feet of the Justices while profoundly important
and incredibly complex issues were presented for their decision. He
presented many of them himself.
In his rather too brief book,' Professor Cox discusses decisions
of the Warren Court affecting civil rights, criminal procedure, judicial
power, first amendment freedoms and electoral procedures. He repeatedly emphasizes the need for judicial action when both the legislature and the executive have failed to take affirmative steps to correct
abuses. The Warren Court readily accepted the responsibility, and the
judicial branch began to decide major aspects of our most pressing
and divisive social, economic and political questions. As a result,
constitutional development under the Warren Court has resulted in
a redistribution of governmental power between the state and federal
governments and among the branches of the federal government itself.
Professor Cox does not believe that it is possible in modern times
and under our democratic system to divorce law from politics. The
docket of the Supreme Court in any recent term reflects the fact that
"[i]n the United States, as nowhere else in the world," ' the courts
are asked to participate in the disposition of critical aspects of social,
economic, political, and philosophical questions. "[C]onstitutional
adjudication presents an insoluble dilemma,"
since the questions
t Washington Correspondent, Editor & Publisher Magazine. Mr. Huston's most
recent book is PATHWAY TO JUDGMENT: A STUDY OF EARL WARREN (1966).
IA. Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF REFORM (1968) [hereinafter cited as Cox]. The book is a compilation of lectures,
edited and expanded, given in 1967 to an audience of lawyers and laymen at a summer
school in Honolulu under joint auspices of the Harvard Law School and the University
of Hawaii.
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presented for decision today require recognition of the political nature
of the Court's task of deciding, according to law, what is best for
the country.
Professor Cox explains how the Warren Court applied the Constitution in answering these questions:
Ability to rationalize a constitutional judgment in terms of
principles referable to accepted sources of law is an essential,
major element of constitutional adjudication. It is one of the
ultimate sources of the power of the Court-including the
power to gain acceptance for the occasional great leaps
forward which lack such justification.
In times of economic, social, and even moral
upheaval the danger of exaggerating the importance of certainty and stability as elements of law is probably greater
than the risk of valuing it too lightly.4
He makes clear his conviction that the Warren Court not only did
not shrink from discarding conventional legal doctrines and sloughing
off precepts of "wise constitutional adjudication" ' erected by earlier
Courts to avoid constitutional rulings, but, in addition, readily assumed
the responsibility for constitutional, rather than statutory, interpretation
of legislative enactments, both federal and state, and thereby plunged
into the political thicket the late Justice Frankfurter often warned it
to avoid.'
The political thicket had grown thickest in the field of human
rights; the failure of the other branches of the federal government to
prune this growth forced the Warren Court to act. Where injustice
exists in the field of human rights, "[1]egislative redress is more
flexible and more effective than judicial intervention," Professor Cox
observes; but he adds that "the student of recent constitutional history
will observe that the Warren Court has been most activist in areas
where politicians were blind to fundamental injustice." 7 He points
out the difference between laws that regulate property and business
conduct and those that concern personal liberties. A marked difference
between the Warren and some earlier Courts is that while the Taft
Court and others moved more often to strike down legislation regulating
or outlawing business conduct, the present tribunal has been quick to
invalidate federal or state legislation it deemed offensive to the principles of the Bill of Rights. No court has been more zealous in using
the Constitution to bulwark individual rights against abridgement by
4 Cox 21-22.
5 Cox 16.
6

See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-70 (1962)

senting).
7 Cox 70.

(Frankfurter, J., dis-
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governmental action. Professor Cox indicates that concern with the
protection of personal liberty and privacy from governmental intrusion
is a major element in the evolution of the Warren Court's approach to
constitutional adjudication.
Successively holding the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to incorporate virtually all of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, the Court has expanded its control over judgments of state
courts and, in effect, has nationalized the administration of justice.
Both by bringing functions previously regarded as within the province
of state courts under the umbrella of the Federal Constitution and by
acting where legislatures have failed to act, the Warren Court has
raised serious questions concerning the role of the judicial branch in
the government of the American people. Decisions thought to invade
"states' rights" account for most of the Court's unpopularity in Congress and afford an explanation for legislative efforts to nullify some
of its judgments and restrict its jurisdiction. However, the manner
in which the Warren Court has played its part also accounts for the
charges that the Court subordinates law to personal political preference
and acts "like a legislature or an omnipotent council of not-so-wise
wise men instead of a court." S
Professor Cox addresses this problem in his chapter on judicial
innovation. Although he does not accede to these charges but rather
believes that the Court's adventures in constitutional adjudication have
contributed to the progress of essential reforms, he nevertheless recognizes their source and criticizes the Court's disposition of a specific
problem in Reitman v. Mulkey.' Reitman illustrates the potential
dangers in constitutional adjudication not rationalized by law, and the
influence exerted by judicial craftsmanship upon the judgments of
lawyers when considering the work of the Court. "'The Court's power
to give its decisions the force of legitimacy ultimately depends upon its
artistry in weaving wise statecraft into the fabric of the law." '0
The Court's artistry failed in Reitman. This case involved California's Proposition 14, wherein the voters, by referendum, amended
the state constitution to prohibit state interference in the disposition
of private housing. The Supreme Court of California sustained the
plaintiffs' contention that adoption of the amendment violated the
fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution; the United States
Supreme Court agreed. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice White
adopted the California tribunal's argument that Proposition 14 would
"encourage and significantly involve the State in private racial discrimination. . ..

""

Professor Cox, dissatisfied with the reasoning,

asks: "Is there really any firm basis for concluding that the adoption
8

Cox 4.
9 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
10 Cox 48.
11387 U.S. at 376.
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of Proposition 14 gave more encouragement to acts of private discrimination than would the mere repeal of an open housing law
. ?,, 12 He wonders whether the Court "gave enough thought to
S.
the implications of placing so much reliance upon the psychological
consequences of State action that is otherwise constitutionally unassailable," 3 and to the proposition that every private person who
14
engages in racial discrimination violates the fourteenth amendment.
"Proposition 14 was a dragon," Professor Cox asserts.
We shall have neither a great society nor even a modicum
of racial calm so long as discrimination in housing breeds
urban ghettos. The repeal of open housing laws seems
even more dangerous than the failure to enact them. But
whether the Supreme Court should play St. George (and,
if so, with what weapons it should slay the beast) is quite
another question.:"
My criticism is that the difficulties were not faced; that the
opinion fails to probe the true issues behind the doctrine of
State action; that the opinion is inscrutable except as it hints
at the proposition that the supposed psychological consequences of a particular bit of State action may render it a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The absence of a
better rationale invites the cynical charge that the Warren
Court is out to slay the dragons without regard to law.' 6
Like others who have "sensed the sheer delight of legal reasoning," Professor Cox acknowledges that he may mistake the importance
of craftsmanship. But, he continues,
if . . . the law is chiefly important as a substitute for and

limitation upon power-and if the capacity of judge-made
law to command free assent .

.

. rest[s] upon principles

more enduring and more general than the wills of individual
judges-then the effectiveness of the Court, its very ability
to slay the dragons, is eroded by any failure to show how
the novel decisions required by changes in human condition
and the realization of bolder aspirations nonetheless draw
their sanction from a continuing community of principle.
The more rapid the pace of social change the faster the law
12Cox 45.
Is Cox 46.
14 When, in 1968, the Court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) to bar all private
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, it found congressional power to
enact the statute not in the fourteenth amendment, but in the thirteenth. Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).

15 Cox 43-44.
16 Cox 46.
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must develop. But the faster pace of legal development would
seem to create still greater need for striving to preserve,
through the articulation of sound rationale, that sense of impartiality and continuity that gives legitimacy, and thus provides the sanction, for the judgments of a court. 7
Professor Cox premises his chapter on civil rights and legislative
power upon the belief that injustices proscribed by the fourteenth
amendment can be eliminated within the framework of law only
through the action of the national government. The Supreme Court
could provide the leadership for abolishing the requirement of "state
action." However, Professor Cox believes that legislative action would
be sounder since racial injustice is a national problem; without federal
legislation, "the civil rights revolution cannot be accomplished within
a framework of law." 18 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decisions
in cases involving civil rights have laid the constitutional foundation
upon which Congress may build an enduring structure "securing
other fundamental human rights." "I For example, federal legislation
could be enacted to punish the private individual "who sought to
silence an unpopular speaker or to suppress the exercise of religion,"
as well as to bring crimes against property "within the federal
domain."

20

Two aspects of the Warren Court's thorough reform of criminal
procedure that Professor Cox regards as deserving particular attention
are electronic eavesdropping and the law of confessions. In his discussion of wiretapping, he deals with specific cases in which the
Supreme Court has applied what he describes as a "contrariety of
views," 2" and a variety of interpretations of statutory and constitutional provisions. While clarifying some aspects of the law, the
decisions have not supplied a clear judgment whether all electronic
surveillance is (or is not) unconstitutional. Rather, the Court has
attempted to strike a balance between outright prohibition and a limited
use of wiretapping that would serve the purposes of law enforcement.
Professor Cox suggests that perhaps the best that can be done under
present circumstances "is to frame a temporary measure designed to
strike a passable accommodation by effectively outlawing the clear
abuses and regularizing the eavesdropping made permissible in such
a way as to provide a factual foundation for subsequent reevaluation." I
However, he does not venture to say whether such temporizing would
meet with the approval of his erstwhile colleague, J. Edgar Hoover,
17Cox 48-49.
18

Cox 55.

'9

Cox 55.
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Cox

64.

21 Cox 78.
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Cox 82.
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or whether future Supreme Courts would find ensuing legislation
constitutional.
Constitutional questions governing the use of confessions in
criminal cases had been debated for decades before the Supreme Court
promulgated definitive rules in Miranda v. Arizona. 3 Few rulings
have provoked more controversy and raised more doubts among
lawyers and in legislative halls. Professor Cox embraces some of these
doubts. He says, "The costs of the Court's activism must be reckoned
in long-range institutional terms," and "the readiness of a bare
numerical majority of the justices to overturn recent precedents
. . . [does] no service to the ideal of law as something distinct from

the arbitrary preferences of individuals." '
Although shifting the judicial responsibility for the administration
of criminal justice from the states to the nation has raised grave
questions, Professor Cox does not feel that as yet the Supreme Court
has "disturbed the processes of representative self-government." "'
Nothing in the Court's opinions, he feels, "is inhospitable to legislative
action rooted in careful investigation, even if it involves some qualification of the doctrines announced in recent cases." 26
Professor Cox begins his examination of the Warren Court's
treatment of first amendment freedoms with a discussion of the Court's
opinions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 2 and Time, Inc. v.
Hill.28 Sullivan repudiated old doctrines of seditious libel in the
discussion of official conduct; Hill raised the question whether New
York's right-of-privacy law protected a family of four held captive
by escaped convicts from having their plight thrust into the limelight
by a false dramatization of their experiences. Cox finds the Hill
opinion deficient for its failure to discuss the constitutional underpinnings
of a doctrine that allows the press a privilege to penetrate the privacy
of the Hill family; he suggests that
the Court was not sufficiently attentive to the complexities of
introducing a new constitutional privilege into an area generally governed by State law.
The New York Times and Hill cases, taken
together, suggest that the Court was more successful in
making a bold thrust forward than in working out corollaries
necessary to integrate the principle into a complex legal
system,9
23384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24 Cox

89.

2Sox 90.
26 Cox 91.

27 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28 385 U.S. 374
29 Cox 101-02.

(1967).
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Group action, Professor Cox asserts, is essential to political
action: freedom of political association must rank next to freedom of
expression. In scrutinizing the Court's decisions in NAACP v.
Alabama"0 and Bates v. Little Rock,3 he sets forth the thesis that
secret associations and far-out groups stimulate important changes in
civilization and are entitled to constitutional protection.
Perhaps heretics are very seldom right, but their value upon
those rare occasions is too great to trust the power to
separate falsehood from truth to government officials. In
protecting heretics the Court is protecting the opportunity
for progress.-'
Some critics of the Court will undoubtedly deny that it has an
obligation to protect heretics, and will consider Professor Cox a little
far-out himself for asserting that it has.
In his view of the electoral process, Professor Cox sees the Court's
extension of its constitutionally granted power to control this process
enlarged by decisions such as Baker v. Carr,33 Katzenbach v. Morgan,3
and Reynolds v. Sims,35 as "bottomed upon the fundamental political
egalitarianism of the American people." 36 These and similar opinions
may have been "against .

.

. ingrained teachings of the lawyer's

profession" 17 and unpopular with professional politicians, but they
revealed "the stark fact that the cancer of malapportionment would
continue to grow" 38 unless halted by some external pressure. Since
neither Congress nor the state legislatures were likely to excise the
cancer, the Court acted to cure it. Professor Cox hopes that these
decisions will shift present party power and revitalize state governments. These decisions, he feels, reflect a conception of a clear
majority of the Warren Court that it is "one of the self-conscious
functions of constitutional adjudication to secure at least some of the
basic democratic elements in the political process." 39
Obviously a supporter of the Warren Court's activism in the
field of constitutional adjudication, Professor Cox predicts that
historians will write that the trend of decisions during the
1950's and 1960's was in keeping with the mainstream of
American history-a bit progressive but also moderate, a bit
30 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

31361 U.S. 516 (1960).
32 Cox

104.
33 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
:34384

U.S. 641 (1966).

35 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
36 Cox 120.
37
Cox 117.
38 Cox 117-18.

39 Cox 114.
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humane but not sentimental, a bit idealistic but seldom
doctrinaire, and in the long run essentially pragmatic-in
short, in keeping with the true genius of our institutions.4
His book is not so much a defense of the Court as an explanation of its
methods of exercising what it conceives to be its constitutional responsibilities. He thinks that on the whole the Warren Court has
exercised those responsibilities well.
"One who has sat in the Supreme Court almost daily awaiting
oral argument or the delivery of opinions acquires both admiration and
affection for the Court and for all the justices," 41 Cox says at the
close of his most interesting volume.
The problems with which they deal are so difficult, the
number and variety of cases are so overwhelming, the implications are so far-reaching, that one sits humbled by the
demands upon them. That the institution of constitutional
adjudication works so well on the whole is testimony not only
to the genius of the institution but to the wisdom and courage
of the individual justices.42
As one who, like Cox, sat many days in the Supreme Court and
listened to countless arguments and decisions, this reviewer, while
not accepting all his premises, is moved to join Professor Cox's paean.
40

Cox 133-34.
Cox 134.
42
Cox 134.
41
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Wayne R. LaFave i
No one would deny that one of the major problems confronting
our society today is the proper functioning and control of our police
agencies. Two presidential commissions have recently given attention
to the problem,' and a growing volume of literature spawned by several
disciplines attempts to analyze the complex issues confronted and
created by the police. 2 Two recent additions to this literature are
Arthur Niederhoffer's Behind the Shield' and Ed Cray's The Big
Blue Line.4 Niederhoffer is a sociologist with over twenty years
of experience in police work, and Cray is director of publications for
the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California.
Cray's purpose is to present a "comprehensive study of the problem of police malpractice," ' apparently to support his concluding
argument for civilian review of complaints against the police. In
large measure he succeeds, for one cannot read through his numerous
accounts of police abuses without being outraged. Cray admits that
he is "a special pleader," although he expresses the hope that he has
"retained his objectivity." 6 I do not question his attempt to remain
objective, 7 although it must be said that his accounts lose some of their
force because of less than adequate concern for what the law is and
what the facts actually are.
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, S.J.D. 1965,
University
of Wisconsin. Member, Wisconsin Bar.
1
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT cbs. 11-13 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as RIOT COMM'N REPORT]; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

ch. 4 (1967), and TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967)

[hereinafter cited as TASK

FORCE
2 REPORT].

Other recent books include M. BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY
(1964); D. BORDUA, THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS (1967); W. LAFAvE,
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965); E. NEWMAN,
POLICE, THE LAW AND PERSONAL FREEDOM (1964) ; POLICE AND THE CHANGING COMMUNITY: SELECTED READINGS (N. Watson ed. 1965) ; J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL (1966); RALPH L. SMITH, THE TARNISHED BADGE (1965); and L. TIFFANY,
D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME (1967).
8A. NIEDERHOFmR, BEHIND THE SHIELD: THE POLICE IN URBAN SOCIETY (1967)
[hereinafter cited as NIEDERHOFFER].
4 E. CRAY, THE BIG BLUE LINE: POLICE PowER vs. HUMAN RIGHTS (1967) [hereinafter cited as CRAY].

5CRAY 7.
6Id. at 15.

7 Some, I am sure, would view the book as biased solely because it is concerned
with police malpractices.
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Although Cray is not a lawyer, and thus might be excused for being unaware of all the technical niceties of the law, it is nonetheless distressing to see the law frequently misstated in a book purporting to
show that the police are breaking the law. For example, all accounts
of police use of weapons in several jurisdictions are tested against the
erroneous assertion that "the law permits a policeman to use his weapon
only to protect his own or a citizen's life from immediate danger or to
apprehend a person known to have committed a felony." 8 Another
broadside, italicized for emphasis, misleadingly states that "whenever
they do delay in arraigning the suspect, the police themselves are
breaking the law," 0 although the next paragraph reveals that the law
is to the contrary. Similarly, Cray charges California police with
repeated violations of law in releasing persons without bringing them
before a magistrate, 0 a rather curious conclusion in view of his observation in the previous paragraph that California law gives the police
this authority.
Cray advises the reader that his book is based upon "more than
200 fully documented cases from fifty police jurisdictions . ... " "

Apparently the reader is expected to accept this without question, as
there is no attempt to indicate what precautions were taken to ensure
the accuracy of what is reported as fact. Cray frequently cites newspaper clippings and notes that much of his material was collected by
attorneys and ACLU offices, leaving the reader with the uneasy feeling
that in some instances Cray merely reports the allegations of those who
claim to be victims of police misconduct. It may well be that most of
these "cases" are largely true, but it would not have been inappropriate
to acknowledge that the police have not cornered the market on falsehoods.'
Indeed, I would find Cray's argument for civilian review
more compelling had he given equal emphasis to the need to prove
valid claims against the police and the need to disprove others in a
fashion that the public would accept as fair and reliable.
Niederhoffer's book is uneven and sometimes lacking in direction,
although the theme of police cynicism (which is treated more specifically in a lengthy appendix) reappears with some frequency. Many
of Niederhoffer's hypotheses concerning police cynicism merely state
the obvious: recruits are less cynical than experienced policemen;
superior officers are less cynical than patrolmen; foot patrolmen are
more cynical than patrolmen assigned to other duties. The discussion
ranges from the heights of sociological jargon (for example, the
8

CRAY 157.
9Id. at 64.
10 Id. at 70.
IlId. at 11.
12 Cray frequently notes instances in which police have lied about their prior misconduct. See, e.g., id. at 68-69. As to those complaining about the police, see note 29
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chapter on anomie) to the depths of precinct locker room tales. In a
sense, however, Behind the Shield complements Cray's book, as it
sheds some light upon why police engage in the kind of malpractices
related in The Big Blue Line.
Some comments on specific subjects discussed in these two books
are in order.
1. Law Enforcement in the Ghetto. On the basis of arrest and
clearance statistics which hardly prove the point, Cray concludes that
"Negro divisions are overpoliced . . . ," 13 and complains that "police
have sought to repress lawbreakers by overmanning these areas." '1
He is wide of the mark. As Niederhoffer correctly observes,"5 and as
ghetto residents have themselves made more than clear,"8 the real need
is for more law enforcement in the ghetto. The Kerner Commission
reached this conclusion:
[P]olice responsibilities in the ghetto are even greater than
elsewhere in the community since the other institutions of
social control have so little authority: the schools, because
so many are segregated, old and inferior; religion, which has
become irrelevant to those who have lost faith as they lost
hope; career aspirations, which for many young Negroes are
totally lacking; the family, because its bonds are so often
snapped. It is the policeman who must deal with the consequences of this institutional vacuum and is then resented for
the presence and the measures this effort demands."'
The basic dilemma in ghetto law enforcement stems from policeminority group hostility, which is manifested and maintained in numerous ways. (a) Cooperation with and assistance to the police is
minimal. "In almost any slum there is a vast conspiracy against the
forces of law and order. If someone approaches asking for a person,
no one there will have heard of him, even if he lives next door." 18 The
police are in part responsible for this situation; they have not always
treated victims and witnesses differently from offenders. Yet, the lack
of cooperation in turn brings about more repressive police measures to
solve crimes and more law enforcement apathy concerning much
ghetto crime. (b) Many police have come to accept violence as a way
of life in the ghetto, and thus do not aggressively seek enforcement of
assault and similar laws when violations involve only Negroes. 9 As
13 CRAY 189.

141d. at 188.
15
NEDERHoFFER 61-63.
1SS
ior Comm'N REPORT 161-62; TASK FORCE REPORT 148-49.
1Rio-r Comm'N REPORT 157.
18 M. HAMINGroN, TnE OrHm A mRIcA 16 (1964), quoted in NiEomRH6FFER 131.

10 IV. LAFAE,

supra note 2 at 110-14.
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a former New York City police inspector has pointed out, "minor
criminals . . . are sometimes treated like children, or are laughed
at, when their violations are the type that run down the minority
community, but do not seriously annoy the police or vocal complainants." 20 (c) Former inspector Brown adds that "it becomes particularly galling to [respectable members of a minority group] when,
on the other hand, they feel that excessive police attention is given to
other violations by their members," 2" indicating that in one sense there
is overenforcement in the ghetto. For example, minor nonprofessional
gambling is often an object of enforcement in the ghetto but not elsewhere. There are undoubtedly various colorably legitimate reasons
for this unevenness, including the fact that such violations are more
likely to be open to police view in the ghetto and the fact that gambling
arrests are a convenient way of improving the enforcement record of
unpopular laws without arousing an effective public outcry. Obviously,
a reordering of law enforcement priorities in the ghetto is necessary.
(d) Finally, there is what is commonly referred to by the police as
aggressive patrol-stopping pedestrians and drivers for questioning and
search. One need not argue that stop-and-frisk is unconstitutional nor
rebut the contention that such tactics are more frequently called for in
high-crime ghetto areas in order to conclude that a more careful assessment of aggressive patrol is needed. Again the Kerner Commission:
"Many police officials believe strongly that there are law enforcement
gains from such techniques. However, these techniques also have
law enforcement liabilities. Their employment therefore should not
be merely automatic but the product of deliberate balancing of pluses
and minuses by command personnel." '
2. Institutionalized Malpractice. The phrase is Cray's, and he
uses it to describe those illegal police activities which are in a sense
routine and which are supported by the tacit approval of superior
officers. Cray refers to the frequent illegal arrests, searches, and detentions which serve, in the eyes of the police, to "keep the lid on" and
to enhance the record of "clearances" (a frequently used measure of
police performance which disregards whether the offender was actually
convicted or whether the police, by their illegal conduct, were responsible for the lack of conviction). As Cray points out, "this institutionalized malpractice, rather than the casual brutality of an individual officer, is the greatest problem." '
Niederhoffer gives us some insight into the persistence of knowing
violation of constitutional rights by the police, even in the face of the
20
William P. Brown, The Police and Cmnmunity Conflict 19 (Paper delivered at
the 8th Annual Institute on Police & Community Relations, Michigan State Univ.,
May2 1962).
1 d.
2 32 Riotr Co-mm'N REPoRT 160.

CRAY 10.
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exclusionary rules. Because of the nature and atmosphere of police
work, the typical police officer's "morality is one of expediency and his
self-conception one of a martyr." ' The police are sensitive to criticism
and, because of their defensive posture, assume-not without some
justification-that the public blames them for the continued existence
of crime. The frequent police response is to shift the blame to the
courts ("the courts are handcuffing the police"), and the police become
convinced by their own propaganda that they cannot both enforce
and comply with the law. Confronted with this apparent dilemma,
the choice too often is to maintain a respectable record of arrests and
clearances. 5 Unfortunately, police administrators have not carefully
considered the possible long-range costs 26 of the choice to maximize
clearances by ignoring constitutional guarantees.
3. CasualActs of Brutality. Cray presents several cases involving
senseless acts of brutality unrelated to any law enforcement objective.
Unlike institutionalized malpractice, which may be understood if not
excused, individual acts of excessive force reflect upon the calibre of
men in police service. It has sometimes been suggested that the problem arises because police work attracts persons who are prone to
aggressive and violent conduct; if so, the basic need is for more careful
screening of police candidates. Niederhoffer, however, presents a
different thesis: "The police system transforms a man into the special
type of authoritarian personality required by the police role." 27 Moreover, Niederhoffer concludes that the system places the most authoritarian men where they have the greatest opportunity to resort to
violence, as the toughest police are assigned to the toughest areas while
those who are less authoritarian tend to move rapidly into service and
supervisory positions. As Cray's case histories illustrate, the authoritarians are most likely to respond with force to what they perceive as
a lack of respect for the police.
Niederhoffer's thesis, if true, certainly complicates the problem,
and points up the necessity of machinery to uncover acts of police
brutality and prevent their recurrence. Unfortunately, police brutality
often recurs, as illustrated by Cray's numerous references to repeated
acts of violence by the same officers. In part this may be attributable
to what Niederhoffer calls "the principle of equilibrium,

.

.

. an

24
NiDERHoFFER 92, quoting W. Westley, The Police: A Sociological Study of
Law, Custom, and Morality ii, 1951 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of

Chicago).
25LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary RulePart I: Current Police and Local Court Practices,30 Mo. L. R v. 391, 457 (1965).
26
Police should take account of the very real possibility that deliberate violation

of existing rules may influence courts to impose even greater restrictions. Id. at 457
& n.212.
27 NiEDERROFR 118.
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organizational imperative that requires the negation of any and all
criticism." 2' Criticism of any one officer, no matter how serious the
charge, is often taken to be criticism of all police, and the tendency is to
close ranks against the outside challenge.
4. Civilian Review Boards. Both authors favor civilian review
boards as a means of airing complaints against the police, and both
authors amply demonstrate how uncommonly silly police spokesmen
have been in charging that "Review Boards undoubtedly can and do
serve as a secret weapon of the Communist Party." ' In my opinion,
the arguments presented establish the need for some form of civilian
review. Cray's 200 cases, even if viewed as charges rather than
proven facts, clearly demonstrate the need for fact-finding machinery
in which the public will have a measure of confidence. (Indeed, if the
police correctly claim that most of the charges made against them are
unfounded,"0 the police have much to gain.) Niederhoffer's analysis
of the police bureaucracy shows the need for some form of outside
scrutiny and pressure.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that civilian review boards
are the answer. For one thing, in view of the longstanding and understandable persecution complex of the police, it does not seem wise to
single them out for special scrutiny. For another, as Professor Walter
Gelihorn has aptly noted, "One may safely guess . . . that disadvantaged persons more frequently find themselves in controversy
with welfare and educational authorities than with the police." 3' 1
find much more promise in Gellhorn's proposal for an ombudsman-type
official who would concentrate not upon the guilt or innocence of particular policemen, but rather upon the effectiveness with which police
superiors have sought out, considered, and acted upon citizen complaints.32 Niederhoffer's analysis supports the notion that pressure
at the higher levels of the police bureaucracy would be most fruitful;
it is there, he observes, that one is most likely to find a new breed of
professionals who would more actively pursue reforms if the pressure
for such reforms were greater than the pressure by the conservative
defenders of traditional police mores.3 3
28 Id. at 13. Similarly, Cray quotes an attorney on the staff of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights as saying: "The police have a pathological paranoia about
complaints; they feel strongly that they are the object of counter-terrorism. They
won't listen to criticism; they're practically hysterical about it." CaY 197.
29 FraternalOrder of Police, Police Review Boards-A Threat to Law Enforcement 4 (undated).
30
See CRAY 173. The St. Louis ACLU affiliate conducted an independent investigation of 20 complaints of police brutality and concluded that only two were well
founded. Civil Liberties, No. 232, Dec. 1965, at 1, col. 3.
a' W. GELLHORN, WimE1

32 Id. at 191.
33
See NiEaEuoFFra 3.4.
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Patrick J. Rohan I
The object of a casebook review all but defies description. The
review cannot be looked upon as a vehicle for introducing the new
arrival to one's law school colleagues, for they receive periodic dispatches from the publisher covering every aspect of the book's development-from conception to delivery. An audience cannot be found
among students, for their examination of casebooks seldom extends
beyond the particular volume assigned by their instructor. Again,
the reviewer cannot evaluate a casebook as might an opening night
critic. If a work is in a professor's field, he will want to examine it
first hand; if in a foreign field, he is likely to be interested in neither
the book nor its review. Accordingly, the reviewer must forsake the
usual objective of influencing others to read (or avoid) the offering
Perhaps more to the point, casebooks are often nothing more than
literary afghans--cases, statutes, and textual passages pieced together.
This all but limits the observer to commenting upon the arrangement
of the squares and the fineness of the stitching. Thus circumscribed, a
casebook review must find its justification in a discussion of the book's
impact upon the law school curriculum and teaching methods.
In my judgment, Professor Berger's work is the most distinctive
property casebook to come along in a generation. In the late forties,
a great debate took place over the content and emphasis of the basic
property course. It is safe to conclude that the private-law orientation
prevailed and that developing public areas (such as zoning and subdivision control) were relegated to the last chapter in each book.
These latter materials represented ten per cent or less of the average
casebook's coverage and received even less class time. Most casebooks
appearing in the last few years have continued to place the modern
materials last in order of presentation, but have expanded treatment
of these topics to twenty or thirty per cent of the overall volume.
Professor Berger departs from this mold by bringing the reader
through all phases of each topic, from the yearbooks to tomorrow
morning's newspaper. In his preface, he makes several points that are
worthy of note:
First: Conveyancing does not belong in the first-year curriculum. Real estate transactions-as they are practiced
today-are pregnant with considerations of income taxation,
financing, and contract. Except possibly for contract, a bet Professor of Law, St. John's University. B.A. 1954, LL.B. 1956, St John's
University. LL.M. 1957, Harvard University. J.S.D. 1965, Columbia University.
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ginning law student lacks the necessary background in these
areas, and if we ignore them, we waste everyone's time ...
Second: It seems irrelevant to concentrate on future interests
in a course that emphasizes land in present-day America ...
Third: Resource allocation, and the means to achieve it,
deserve equal billing with the more conventional chapters on
estates in land.
Fourth: Property is no longer a common law (or even a
private law) discipline, a realization that has been slow to
arrive. State and local legislatures-and, of course, the
Federal Government-are recasting the institution of property
with breath-taking speed; to what end is what this course
examines.'
Carrying this credo into execution, Professor Berger allocates 112
pages to the institution of property; 131 pages to classification of
interests in land; 46 pages to the formation of interests by operation
of law, and 103 pages to landlord and tenant. The remaining 646
pages are devoted to allocation and development of land resources.
There are no chapters devoted to the land contract, deeds, recording
and other traditional conveyancing subjects. This rough table of
contents gives some idea of the changes Professor Berger has made
in the content and emphasis of the basic property materials.
In addition to its modern outlook, the strength of this casebook
lies in its depth and in its ability to present traditional materials in a
stimulating manner. These qualities reflect the great pains Professor
Berger has taken in the selection process and in the preparation of
copious notes and probing questions. The book's only flaw, if such
it be, lies in the complete omission of conveyancing materials. While
I embrace every word of the last three points made in Professor
Berger's preface, serious objections must be voiced concerning his
views with respect to conveyancing. Far from being overly difficult,
the study of voluntary land transfers gives structure and direction to
the property course. Similarly, conveyancing provides the backdrop
for a study of adverse possession, title insurance and other interesting
topics. Although subject to being drawn out, a presentation of the
recording acts offers the unique opportunity to compare four or five
statutory solutions to a unitary set of problems. Moreover, other
instructors may proceed on the assumption that students receive their
grounding in caveat emptor and bona fide purchaser principles in the
property course. Finally, it seems incongruous to probe complex socioeconomic aspects of property, such as slum clearance and relocation
I C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE ix-x

(1968).
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problems, when the fundamentals of voluntary land acquisitions have
not been investigated. This is analogous to embarking upon advanced
estate planning without the benefit of prior studies in wills, trusts and
future interests. In my judgment, condensation of the conveyancing
materials would have been preferable to their complete elimination.
Despite the omission of conveyancing, this casebook will have a
marked impact on the future direction of the basic property course.
The omission may even be a blessing in disguise, prompting instructors
to prepare their own supplementary materials. This reviewer found
Professor Berger's materials on allocation and development of land
resources so provocative that they were adopted as the nucleus of a
seminar in land use planning. Few casebooks bring enduring credit
to their authors, but every few years a Hart & Wechsler or Casner &
Leach appears on the scene. Professor Berger's product belongs in
that company.

